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Natural gas contributes a growing share of the world’s energy mix. In this paper we use national-
level data for a sample of 44 countries to estimate the price and income elasticities of natural gas 
demand. We present both single-equation results and results instrumenting natural gas prices 
with proved natural gas reserves. Our instrument includes both domestic reserves and distance-
weighted reserves in other countries. We obtain estimates of the average long-run price elasticity 
of natural gas demand of around –1.25 and of the average long-run income elasticity of natural 
gas demand of +1 and higher. We also present separate estimates for final natural gas demand by 
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1. Introduction 
Natural gas contributed 21% of the global energy mix in 2013, up from 16% in 1971 
(International Energy Agency [IEA], 2015a). There is sizeable variation in the importance of 
natural gas in national energy mixes, with both high-income countries and countries rich in 
natural gas deposits tending to be more reliant on this energy source (Burke, 2013). Relatively 
strong growth in natural gas use is expected over coming decades, with the IEA (2011) referring 
to a “golden age” for natural gas and expecting the fuel’s share of the global energy mix to 
increase to 23–24% by 2040 in its “new policies” and “current policies” scenarios (IEA, 2015b). 
Recent booms in shale gas and coal seam gas are helping to fuel this expansion. 
 
There are large differences in end-user natural gas prices between countries (Holz et al., 2015; 
Makholm, 2015). These result from the costs involved in transporting natural gas by pipeline or 
in liquefied form, local tax/subsidy policies, and other factors. The IEA (2015b) estimates that 
price subsidies for consumers of natural gas equaled $107 billion globally in 2014, more than 
half of which was in only four countries (Iran, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi 
Arabia). Consumer subsidies for natural gas are a product of policies such as price regulations 
and domestic natural gas reservations. 
 
Natural gas is composed mostly of methane (CH4), but can also have proportions of ethane, 
propane, butane, pentane, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, hydrogen sulfide, and/or water. Humans use 
the fuel for heating, transport, industrial operations, electricity generation, and other purposes. 
Natural gas-fired electricity generation plants offer flexibility to the electricity generation system 
through relatively fast start-up and ramping speeds (Neumann and von Hirschhausen, 2015). 
Relative to coal and oil, natural gas is also associated with fewer emissions of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) or local pollutants such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and particulates 
(IEA, 2011). Methane leakage during the extraction, processing, and transport of natural gas 
reduces its greenhouse benefits, however (Howarth, 2014). Transport costs mean that 
international trade in natural gas occurs within several regional markets, each with different 
prices (IEA, 2015b). 
 
In this study we use national-level data for 44 countries over the period 1978–2011 to obtain 
aggregate estimates of the price and income elasticities of natural gas demand. We also estimate 
separate elasticities for total natural gas consumption by industry and households. Understanding 
the sizes of these elasticities is useful for parameterizing energy-economy models. Knowing the 
price elasticity of natural gas demand is also useful for understanding the effects of adjustments 
to tax settings for natural gas, as well as the local consumption effects of opening natural gas 
markets to international trade. Countries maintaining artificially low domestic natural gas prices 
– a group that even includes net importers such as China (Razavi, 2009; IEA, 2011; Aolin and 
Qing, 2015; Lin et al., 2015; Paltsev and Zhang, 2015) – could use our estimates to forecast the 
implications of natural gas price reform for domestic natural gas consumption. 
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Figure 1 plots the average of end-user natural gas prices for (a) industry and (b) households 
against natural gas consumption per capita for 31 countries in 2010, both logged. The fitted line 
has the appearance of a downward-sloping demand curve: lower natural gas prices are on 
average associated with higher per capita natural gas consumption. The Figure also illustrates 
substantial cross-country variation in both natural gas prices and per capita natural gas 
consumption. In our regressions we will include additional variables that help to explain natural 
gas consumption. 
 
Figure 1. Natural gas prices and per capita consumption, 2010 
 
Notes: Covers 31 countries. The average price is the simple mean of the average prices paid by (a) 
industry and (b) households. Consumption covers all primary energy derived from natural gas. The year 
2010 is used as more observations are available for this year than for 2011. World Bank country codes are 
used. Price is shown on the y-axis in line with the standard presentation of a demand curve. Sources: IEA 
(2015a, 2015c). 
 
This paper builds on a body of research estimating the price and income elasticities of demand 
for natural gas, often for a specific sector in a single country. There are advantages to our 
aggregate approach. First is that our study is able to span countries representing 50% of the 
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world’s population and 72% of global natural gas consumption as of 2011. Aggregate elasticities 
are also useful for modelling macro-level trends in natural gas use. It should be expected that the 
price elasticity of demand for natural gas is more elastic at the aggregate level than in some 
micro-level contexts, as there are more substitution possibilities at higher levels of aggregation. 
 
A key contribution of our paper is the use of a supply-side instrumental variable (IV) strategy to 
address the potential for endogeneity in natural gas prices. We instrument each country’s natural 
gas price with the proved (and yet to be extracted) natural gas reserves of that country and of 
other countries, where other countries’ natural gas reserves are weighted using a negative power 
function of distance. The instrument gives a higher weight to reserves in nearby countries and a 
lower weight to reserves in distant countries. Our instrument is measured in million cubic feet 
per capita. Natural gas reserves is a potentially suitable instrument because countries that are rich 
in natural gas, or that have neighbors rich in natural gas, tend to have lower natural gas prices on 
account of the smaller transport and other transactions costs from extraction point to market. 
Countries with natural gas endowments and/or access to nearby supplies are also more likely to 
supply below-cost or lowly-taxed natural gas to domestic consumers. An example is Kazakhstan 
(Figure 1). Our IV exclusion restriction is that natural gas reserves affect natural gas demand 
only via the natural gas price. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our method and data. Section 3 presents our 
results. Section 4 compares the results to prior estimates. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Method and data 
2.1 Specification 
We begin by estimating a cross-country aggregate demand function for natural gas consumption 
(G) in country c during 2010: 
ln𝐺𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽ln𝑃𝑐 + 𝛾ln𝑌𝑐 + 𝛿ln𝑆𝑐 + 𝜂ln𝐿𝑐 + 𝜃𝑇𝑐 + 𝜅ln𝐷𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐    (1) 
 
where P is the average end-user price of natural gas, calculated as the simple mean of the end-
user prices for industry and households. Y is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, S is the 
size of each country’s population, L is land area, T is average temperature in ◦C,1 D is the price of 
road-sector gasoline (a proxy for the price of oil substitutes), and ε is an error term. Eq. (1) uses 
between variation, which means that coefficients will have a long-run interpretation on the 
assumption that variables are settled at long-run equilibria (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). We expect 
β (the long-run price elasticity of demand) to be negative and γ (the long-run income elasticity of 
demand) to be positive. 𝛿 is expected to be positive, as larger populations are likely to consume 
more natural gas. We expect θ to be negative, as natural gas is commonly used for heating 
purposes in cold climates. 2010 is used for our cross-section estimates as it allows for a larger 
                                                 
1 The average temperature is not logged as it is zero or negative in some or all years in Canada, Finland, 
and Russia. 
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sample of countries than is available for 2011. Our use of natural gas consumption (cf. 
production) data and the end-user (cf. extraction) price is as is suitable for estimating a demand 
(cf. supply) function. 
 
We have access to data for more than one year (y), allowing us to form a country-level panel, 
albeit one that is unbalanced due to missing observations. We thus proceed to a panel 
specification: 
ln𝐺𝑐,𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽ln𝑃𝑐,𝑦 + 𝛾ln𝑌𝑐,𝑦 + 𝛿ln𝑆𝑐,𝑦 + 𝜂ln𝐿𝑐,𝑦 + 𝜃𝑇𝑐,𝑦 + 𝐼𝑦 + 𝐼𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑦 (2) 
 
where D has been removed due to data limitations. 
 
We use three panel estimators: 
a) Between estimator, which uses the mean of each series for each country, and so exploits 
only between variation; the between estimates exclude the year dummies (Iy) and country 
dummies (Ic) 
b) Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with year dummies but no country dummies 
c) Fixed-effects estimator with year dummies, i.e. the full Eq. (2) 
 
The between estimator is thought to provide long-run estimates, and, like the cross-sectional 
estimator, avoids time series issues such as the existence of unit roots and the precise 
specification of dynamics (Baltagi and Griffin, 1983, 1984; Pirotte, 1999, 2003; Baltagi, 2008; 
Stern, 2010). The static fixed-effects estimator controls for time-invariant country characteristics 
such as geography but, by focusing on within variation, is likely to pick up shorter-run effects. 
Shorter-run effects should be expected to be smaller than long-run effects, as it likely takes time 
for natural gas use to respond to price changes, especially given the importance of long-run 
contracts (Neumann and von Hirschhausen, 2015) and of infrastructure lock-in in energy 
markets. Estimates from static pooled OLS regressions might be expected to lie somewhere in-
between the between estimates and the static fixed-effects estimates. An alternative approach to 
obtain long-run elasticities is to estimate a distributed lag model. We find that the long-run price 
elasticity from fixed-effects distributed lag models converges to the price elasticity obtained 
using the between estimator. The relatively short and unbalanced time-series component of the 
data does not suit a country-by-country time-series analysis.  
 
While data constraints prevent us from directly controlling for the prices of all energy 
substitutes, changes in prices of globally-traded energy sources (e.g. oil) are captured by the year 
fixed effects in our pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates. As will be mentioned, we also 
obtain similar results controlling for each country’s per capita oil and coal reserves, measures 
that are likely to be correlated with final consumer prices of oil and coal (Burke and Nishitateno, 
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2013). It would be undesirable to control for electricity prices, as natural gas is an input to 
electricity generation as well as an end-use substitute for electricity.2 
 
In additional specifications we estimate the price and income elasticities of final use of natural 
gas by industry and households using the average end-user prices paid by these sectors.3 
Globally, industry and households accounted for 36% and 30% of final use of natural gas in 
2011, respectively (IEA, 2015a).4 We maintain the same control set for these industry and 
household final-use regressions. With the exception of the between estimates, we present 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity, and – for the panel estimates – clustered by 
country to allow for country-by-country patterns of autocorrelation. 
 
2.2 Instrumental variable strategy 
Estimating demand functions is subject to a famous endogeneity challenge: price and quantity 
may be jointly determined, so it is not certain that a single-equation framework will provide 
consistent estimates.5 Specifically, each country’s natural gas demand should be expected to 
have an influence on each country’s natural gas price if the natural gas supply curve is not 
perfectly elastic. Estimates of the long-run price elasticity of natural gas supply are positive and 
finite (Krichene, 2002), meaning that potential endogeneity is indeed important to consider.  
 
To address endogeneity concerns we present estimates using per capita proved natural gas 
reserves as an instrument for the natural gas price. This is similar to Burke and Nishitateno 
(2013)’s use of per capita oil reserves to instrument for the gasoline price when estimating the 
demand function for gasoline.6 Because natural gas reserves in neighboring countries are likely 
to influence each country’s natural gas price, we define our instrument to include not only 
domestic natural gas reserves, but also distance-weighted reserves in other countries, using a 
negative power weighting approach. The instrument is: 
 
(𝑅𝑐,𝑦 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑐
−169
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖,𝑦)/𝑆𝑐,𝑦        (3)  
 
where R is proved natural gas reserves in million cubic feet, i indexes other countries, and d is 
the simple distance between the most populous cities in country c and country i, in kilometers. 
The 69 other countries include every country with year-2011 proved natural gas reserves equal to 
                                                 
2 Natural gas accounted for 22% of global electricity generation in 2013 (IEA, 2015a). 
3 Final natural gas use covers only direct consumption by end-use sectors, and does not include energy 
generated using natural gas but delivered in another form such as electricity. At the national level, 
primary use covers all uses. 
4 Equivalent to 15% and 17% of global primary natural gas use, respectively. 
5 The identification of demand and supply was the spur to the development of the instrumental variable 
approach. See Angrist and Krueger (2001) for a review. 
6 Burke and Nishitateno (2015) also use the approach in exploring how gasoline prices influence road 
fatalities. 
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or exceeding 1 trillion cubic feet (including countries not in our estimation sample). Our 
approach means that the natural gas reserves of a country 50 kilometers away are weighted at 
0.04% of their actual value; 100 kilometers away at 0.01%; and 1,000 kilometers away at 
0.0001%. The instrument hence primarily considers each country’s domestic reserves and the 
reserves of near neighbors. Our approach of allocating low weights to reserves in distant 
countries is suitable given the relatively high transport costs of natural gas. Our paper is the first 
to use natural gas reserves to instrument natural gas prices. 
 
The first requirement for our instrument to be valid is that per capita natural gas reserves are 
indeed correlated with natural gas prices. Given the high transport costs for natural gas and the 
likelihood of higher natural gas taxes in natural gas-poor countries and price subsidies in natural 
gas-rich countries, we hypothesize that there is a negative correlation between per capita natural 
gas reserves and natural gas prices. Tests will confirm this negative correlation and also that our 
instrument is typically able to provide strong first-stage identification. 
 
The second requirement is that per capita natural gas reserves are independent of ε, so that 
natural gas reserves affect the quantity of natural gas demanded only via the natural gas price. If 
natural gas-rich countries (or countries with natural gas-rich neighbors) are more likely to use 
natural gas at any given price, this requirement would not be satisfied. It is possible that this is 
the case: governments of natural gas-rich countries may use non-price mechanisms to encourage 
natural gas use in an effort to achieve domestic energy self-sufficiency, for example. While our 
IV approach is thus not without limitation, we believe it worth pursuing given that the dominant 
channel via which domestic endowments of natural gas are likely to affect natural gas 
consumption is via a lower required price to purchase natural gas. Our approach also involves 
assuming that historical exploration effort for natural gas is not a function of current domestic 
demand for this fuel. This is in part able to be justified by the fact that the domestic market is 
only one source of demand for any country’s natural gas, so incentives for exploration exist even 
in the context of low domestic demand.7 Current extraction of natural gas affects reserves and 
may contaminate our instrument, but we obtain similar results instrumenting with five-year 
lagged per capita natural gas reserves.8 
 
A final note on our instrument is that it primarily provides information useful for identifying 
cross-country differences in natural gas prices. The time-series dimension of the instrument is 
likely to be less useful, as (a) year-to-year variation in proved natural gas reserves is not always 
reflective of on-the-ground changes9; and (b) final end-user prices are likely to often take time to 
                                                 
7 Exploration effort may be a function of variables such as GDP per capita, but GDP per capita is 
controlled for in our regressions. 
8 We also obtain a similar single-equation estimate using a five-year lagged natural gas price term. 
9 Russia’s proved natural gas reserves have only been updated once during 1997–2011, for example. For 
some countries, there are some sudden revisions in natural gas reserves. 
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adjust to changes in natural gas supply, for reasons including that some prices are regulated and 
that long-term contracts have historically been an important feature of the natural gas market. 
For this reason, and to minimize challenges associated with weak instruments, we do not use our 
instrument in our fixed effects estimates. 
 
2.3 Data 
We use national-level data on natural gas consumption and prices from the IEA (2015a, 2015c). 
The IEA’s price data are the best we are aware of for an aggregate study with broad country and 
time coverage. P is measured in US$ per megawatt hour (MWh), deflated using the GDP 
deflator of the United States.10 For our panel sample, total natural gas use by industry is similar 
in magnitude to total natural gas use by households, meaning that the simple average of prices 
for the two groups is similar to the weighted average. The prices include fixed charges; the data 
do not allow us to separate out the effect of marginal charges. Y, obtained from Feenstra et al. 
(2015), is in purchasing power parity terms and, like P, is measured in real US$. T is each 
country’s average annual temperature as reported by Harris et al. (2014). We obtain data on S, L, 
and D from the World Bank (2015). Natural gas reserves are as reported by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (2015). Distance data are from CEPII (2016). A complete list of 
variable definitions and sources is provided in the Appendix. 
 
Our reported estimations cover 44 countries over the 34-year period 1978–2011. Non-availability 
of natural gas price data for some country-years reduces individual sample sizes, however, with 
our panel for aggregate natural gas demand covering 775 country-year observations from 39 
countries. Larger samples can be used in the regressions for industry and households. The IEA 
(2015c) also provides data on the natural gas prices faced by the electricity generation sector, but 
we do not use this series as it covers a smaller number of country-years. 
 
Of the 34 current members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), only Iceland, Israel, and Norway do not appear in our sample due to missing price data 
and, in the case of Iceland, zero reported use of natural gas. Our dataset also includes Russia, 
China, Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Brazil, Chinese Taipei, Romania, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Croatia (ordered from largest to smallest primary consumer of natural 
gas in 2011). 2011 is the final year for which the IEA (2015c) natural gas price data are available 
for non-OECD countries, which is the reason our sample ends in this year. The countries in our 
sample are shown in Figure 2. 
 
                                                 
10 Similar results are obtained if we (a) do not deflate, or (b) deflate with the US consumer price index. 
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Figure 2. Countries in our sample 
 
Note: 44 countries in total. See Table 1 for a list. 
 
Before proceeding to the results, Table 1 presents data for our instrument. The table is for the 
year 2011 for the 44 countries in our estimation sample, and in aggregate rather than per capita 
terms. The countries with the largest natural gas reserves in our study are Russia, the United 
States, Venezuela, and Australia. Our measure including distance-weighted reserves is on 
average 3% larger than the domestic reserves measure. The most notable effect of adding in 
distance-weighted reserves is for some European countries that are themselves natural gas-poor, 
but have natural gas-rich neighbors. Lithuania, for example, has 3.54 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas reserves assigned to it by our instrument, primarily due to its proximity to Russia. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Aggregate estimates 
Results for aggregate primary use of natural gas are presented in Table 2, with the single-
equation estimates shown in columns 1–4 and the IV estimates in columns 5–7. 
 
Focusing firstly on the single-equation estimates, the price elasticities of demand in the cross-
sectional and between estimates are both near –1.25. The similarity of these estimates suggests 
that the long-run price elasticity of natural gas demand has been quite stable over time. This 
elasticity is significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. We are unable to reject the null 
hypotheses that the elasticity equals –1. The point estimate of the price elasticity of demand in 
the fixed-effects specification is –0.55, consistent with this estimator picking up shorter-run 
effects. The pooled OLS estimate is –0.95. The point estimates of the income elasticities of 
natural gas demand are +1.01 to +1.65 in the first three columns, with tests unable to reject the 
nulls that natural gas demand has unit income elasticity. The income elasticity in the fixed-
effects specification is 0.70. The long-run population elasticities are quite close to unity. The 
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results provide no significant evidence that land area, average temperature, or the gasoline price 
have any effects on natural gas use.11 
 
Table 1. Measures of natural gas reserves 
Country Proved 
reserves 
Proved reserves + 
distance-weighted 
proved reserves 
in other countries 
  Country Proved 
reserves 
Proved reserves + 
distance-weighted 
proved reserves 
in other countries 
Russia 1,680.00  1,681.48   Croatia 0.88 3.19 
United States 304.63  305.47   Finland 0.00 3.17 
Venezuela, RB 178.86  179.56   Austria 0.57 2.98 
Australia 110.00  110.51   Turkey 0.22 2.96 
China 107.00  108.06   Slovak Republic 0.50 2.94 
Indonesia 106.00  106.87   Hungary 0.29 2.80 
Kazakhstan 85.00  87.11   Bulgaria 0.20 2.72 
Canada 61.95  63.23   Sweden 0.00 2.70 
Netherlands 49.00  50.99   Czech Republic 0.14 2.52 
Pakistan 29.67  32.03   Greece 0.04 2.43 
Brazil 12.94  13.58   Slovenia 0.00 2.26 
Mexico 11.97  12.63   Belgium 0.00 2.23 
Thailand 11.03  12.20   France 0.24 2.20 
United Kingdom 9.04  10.94   Luxembourg 0.00 2.14 
Poland 5.82  8.68   Switzerland 0.00 2.06 
Germany 6.20  8.49   Ireland 0.35 2.04 
Romania 2.23  4.97   Spain 0.09 1.77 
Denmark 2.05  4.48   New Zealand 1.21 1.71 
Italy 2.25  4.36   Japan 0.74 1.61 
Chile 3.46  4.01   Portugal 0.00 1.47 
Lithuania 0.00  3.54   Chinese Taipei 0.22 1.20 
Estonia 0.00  3.23    Korea, Rep. 0.04 1.08 
Notes: The unit is trillion cubic feet. The distance-weighted measure is defined in the text. Countries are 
listed in descending order of the distance-weighted measure. A per capita version, in million cubic feet, is 
used as the instrument. The table shows the 44 countries in our estimation sample. 
 
The IV estimations in Table 2 achieve relatively strong first-stage identification, with F statistics 
on the instrument exceeding 20.12 These regressions pass the Stock and Yogo (2005) test for 
weak instruments. The instrument has the expected negative sign in the first stage, with an 
additional million cubic feet of proved natural gas reserves per capita on average associated with 
natural gas prices being around 20% lower, holding the other variables constant. For context, the 
panel sample-average natural gas reserves (including distant-weighted reserves overseas) is 0.94 
million cubic feet per capita, with a minimum of 0.01 (Japan) and maximum of 11.67 (Russia).
                                                 
11 We continue to find an insignificant temperature effect if we use the average temperature of the coldest 
month of each year in place of the average temperature of the year. 
12 The first-stage F statistic for the instrument is not available for the IV between estimator. 
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Table 2. Results for aggregate natural gas use 
Dependent variable: Ln Natural gas consumption (primary)c,y             
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 Single equation  IV 
Specification Cross-section 
(2010) 
BE Pooled FE   Cross-section 
(2010) 
BE Pooled 
Ln Natural gas price (average of industry 
and household prices; real)c,y 
-1.25*** -1.26*** -0.95*** -0.55***   -1.37*** -1.15** -1.58*** 
(0.37) [0.50] (0.35) [0.46] (0.21) [0.83] (0.16) [0.01]  (0.47) [0.43] (0.52) [0.76] (0.52) [0.27] 
Ln GDP per capitac,y 1.01*** 1.65*** 1.39*** 0.70**  1.05*** 1.53** 1.92*** 
(0.20) [0.96] (0.56) [0.25] (0.28) [0.17] (0.32) [0.35]  (0.20) [0.81] (0.70) [0.45] (0.49) [0.06] 
Ln Populationc,y 1.20*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 0.41  1.21*** 1.05*** 1.15*** 
(0.13) (0.18) (0.10) (1.30)  (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) 
Ln Landc,y -0.19 -0.08 -0.02   -0.20 -0.06 -0.14 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.10)   (0.12) (0.17) (0.14) 
Temperature (◦C)c,y -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01  -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Ln Gasoline pricec,y 0.53     0.66   
(0.42)         (0.54)     
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes  No Yes No 
Observations 31 775 775 775  31 775 775 
Countries 31 39 39 39  31 39 39 
R2 0.93 0.74 0.79 0.55  0.93 0.74 0.76 
First stage:         
   Coefficient for instrument - - - -  -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.16*** 
   Instrument F statistic - - - -   24.70 n.a. 38.81 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. With the exception of the between estimates, standard errors (in 
parentheses) are robust and, for pooled and FE estimates, clustered at the country level. The figures in square brackets are p-values from tests that 
the price elasticity equals –1 or income elasticity equals +1. The R2s reflect the power of the explanatory variables, except country fixed effects. 
Coefficients on constants and country and year fixed effects are not reported. Ln Land is excluded from the FE estimation given its lack of time-
series variation. The instrumented variable is the log natural gas price. This is instrumented by natural gas reserves per capita (including distance-
weighted reserves of other countries; see Eq. (3)). The Stock-Yogo 5% critical value for 10% (15%) maximal IV size is 16.38 (8.96). The null of a 
weak instrument is rejected if the F statistic on the instrument exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical value. BE = between estimator. FE = fixed effects. 
IV = instrumental variable. n.a = not available. 
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The second-stage IV results are quite similar to the single-equation results, suggesting that price-
quantity endogeneity issues might not in the end be substantial when estimating the demand 
function for natural gas use at the aggregate level.13 The cross-sectional and between IV 
estimates of the long-run price elasticity of natural gas demand are –1.37 and –1.15, with t-tests 
unable to reject the (separate) nulls that each equals –1. The most notable difference relative to 
the single-equation results is the larger price and income elasticity estimates for the pooled 
specification. The results on the controls are similar. The R2 values in Table 2 are high, 
suggesting that 74–93% of the between variation and around 55% of the within variation in log 
natural gas consumption is explained by the variables in our model. 
 
3.2 Estimates for industry and households 
Table 3 presents results for final consumption of natural gas by industry, still aggregated 
nationally. The price variable is the log real average natural gas price paid by the industrial 
sector. Income continues to be measured by log national GDP per capita. Focusing firstly on the 
single-equation specifications, the estimated price elasticity of demand in the cross-sectional 
estimate in column 1 is –1.21, similar to the result for aggregate natural gas use in Table 2. The 
between estimate is smaller (–0.82). It is not possible to reject the nulls that each of these 
elasticities equal –1. The fixed-effects price elasticity is smaller still (–0.37), likely a shorter-run 
response. The income elasticities of demand continue to be statistically indistinguishable from 
+1, except in the fixed-effects estimate. 
 
The IV estimates in Table 3 continue to suggest that the long-run price elasticity of natural gas 
demand by industry is around –1. One exception is the cross-sectional IV estimate in column 5, 
although the first-stage identification in this column is relatively weak (F statistic on the 
instrument = 6). We obtain a slightly larger point estimate of this price elasticity (–0.72) using 
the Fuller (1977) estimator, which allows for improved inference when instruments are weak. 
Stronger first-stage identification is obtained in the panel estimates in columns 6–7. The pooled 
IV estimate is remarkably similar to the pooled single-equation estimate. Once again we 
conclude that addressing endogeneity does not substantially alter our conclusions on the price 
elasticity of natural gas use. 
 
Table 4 presents estimates for final consumption of natural gas by households. The long-run 
price elasticity point estimates remain similar, but the fixed-effect estimate becomes very small 
(–0.13) and is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that household natural gas 
demand is very inelastic in the short run. The income elasticity point estimates are greater than 
+1 in all except the fixed effects estimate, reflecting strong growth in household natural gas use 
as incomes rise.
                                                 
13 A similar conclusion was reached by Burke and Nishitateno (2013) for road-sector gasoline. 
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Table 3. Results for industry 
Dependent variable: Ln Natural gas consumption by industry (final)c,y           
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 Single equation  IV 
Specification Cross-section 
(2010) 
BE Pooled FE   Cross-section 
(2010) 
BE Pooled 
Ln Natural gas price 
(industry; real)c,y 
-1.21** -0.82*** -1.00*** -0.37***  -0.62 -1.09** -1.00** 
(0.48) [0.67] (0.26) [0.50] (0.16) [0.99] (0.13) [0.00]  (0.63) [0.55] (0.50) [0.86] (0.41) [0.99] 
Ln GDP per capitac,y 0.71*** 1.29*** 1.17*** 0.40  0.65*** 1.47*** 1.17*** 
(0.23) [0.21] (0.32) [0.36] (0.22) [0.44] (0.29) [0.04]  (0.22) [0.11] (0.43) [0.27] (0.28) [0.54] 
Ln Populationc,y 1.25*** 0.81*** 0.93*** 1.48  1.17*** 0.83*** 0.93*** 
(0.15) (0.13) (0.09) (1.03)  (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) 
Ln Landc,y -0.34* -0.05 -0.02   -0.22 -0.10 -0.02 
 (0.18) (0.12) (0.08)   (0.20) (0.15) (0.12) 
Temperature (◦C)c,y -0.05*** -0.00 -0.03* 0.00  -0.05*** -0.00 -0.03* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ln Gasoline pricec,y 0.46     0.05   
(0.49)         (0.60)     
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes  No No Yes 
Observations 34 840 840 840  34 840 840 
Countries 34 43 43 43  34 43 43 
R2 0.90 0.72 0.79 0.27  0.89 0.72 0.79 
First stage:         
   Coefficient for instrument - - - -  -0.07** -0.14*** -0.16*** 
   Instrument F statistic - - - -   5.98 n.a. 17.98 
Notes: Same as for Table 2. 
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Table 4. Results for households 
Dependent variable: Ln Natural gas consumption by households (final)c,y           
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 Single equation  IV 
Specification Cross-section 
(2010) 
BE Pooled FE   Cross-
section 
(2010) 
BE Pooled 
Ln Natural gas price 
(household; real)c,y 
-1.43*** -0.90** -0.64*** -0.13   -1.36*** -1.13** -1.44** 
(0.43) [0.32] (0.34) [0.76] (0.17) [0.04] (0.16) [0.00]  (0.46) [0.44] (0.49) [0.80] (0.65) [0.50] 
Ln GDP per capitac,y 1.35*** 2.62*** 2.10*** 0.58  1.32*** 2.94*** 2.94*** 
(0.34) [0.32] (0.68) [0.02] (0.41) [0.01] (0.57) [0.47]  (0.33) [0.34] (0.84) [0.02] (0.80) [0.02] 
Ln Populationc,y 1.69*** 1.35*** 1.36*** -0.62  1.69*** 1.36*** 1.49*** 
(0.14) (0.23) (0.21) (2.84)  (0.13) (0.23) (0.25) 
Ln Landc,y -0.49*** -0.32* -0.27   -0.49*** -0.36* -0.37* 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.16)   (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) 
Temperature (◦C)c,y -0.12*** -0.07 -0.08* 0.01  -0.12*** -0.06 -0.06 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ln Gasoline pricec,y 1.43**     1.34**   
(0.61)         (0.67)     
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes  No No Yes 
Observations 35 850 850 850  35 850 850 
Countries 35 40 40 40  35 40 40 
R2 0.87 0.65 0.61 0.28  0.87 0.65 0.56 
First stage:         
   Coefficient for instrument - - - -  -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.19*** 
   Instrument F statistic - - - -   10.24 n.a. 19.99 
Notes: Same as for Table 2. 
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In Tables 3 and 4 we find some evidence that industry and households in countries with warmer 
temperatures use less natural gas, and that countries with larger land masses also use less natural 
gas (ceteris paribus). The latter may be because natural gas distribution networks are less viable 
in less densely populated countries. We also find evidence that natural gas and gasoline appear to 
be substitutes for households: where the price of gasoline is higher, households tend to consume 
more natural gas. The variables in our model explain the majority of the cross-country variation 
in household natural gas use, but less than one-third of the year-to-year within variation. 
 
3.3 Distributed lag models 
Table 5 presents distributed lag specifications, for which we revert back to aggregate primary 
natural gas use. The distributed lags allow us to examine the dynamics of natural gas responses 
to price changes and obtain an alternative estimate of the long-run price elasticity of demand. We 
employ country fixed effects, year dummies, and single-equation estimations. Lagged price 
terms back to y–8 are included. Lagged income terms were also tested, but were statistically 
insignificant and so we excluded them. 
 
The estimate in column 9 of Table 5 provides a long-run price elasticity of natural gas demand of 
–0.68, only slightly larger than the elasticity from the static fixed-effects estimate (–0.55). The –
0.68 point estimate is not statistically different from –1, and is similar to the between estimate for 
the same sub-sample (see the base of Table 5). The estimates suggest that the long-run effect 
from a distributed lag model converges to the between estimate as additional lags are added, as 
expected if both estimators are providing long-run effects.14 Unfortunately, adding lagged price 
terms reduces the sample size. Because the between estimator provides a larger price elasticity 
for the full sample (–1.26), it seems appropriate to conclude that our best estimate of the long-run 
price elasticity of natural gas demand is unity or above. Table 5’s estimates of the aggregate 
income elasticity of demand are generally close to unity. 
 
3.4 Robustness issues 
We here discuss the effects of some additional estimation issues. Our results are similar in 
single-equation and IV estimates that also control for each country’s per capita oil and coal 
reserves, which reduces the concern that results are confounded by oil and coal availability and 
prices. We also obtain quite similar long-run price and income elasticities of natural gas demand 
when including region dummies (using the World Bank classifications). Using an interaction 
between the log natural gas price and log GDP per capita, we find no significant evidence that 
the price elasticity of natural gas demand differs for countries at different per capita income 
levels. 
 
One potentially confounding factor is environmental effort: countries with strict environmental 
stances may have both higher fossil fuel taxes and additional policies to reduce fossil fuel use, 
                                                 
14 The same was reported by Burke and Nishitateno (2015). See also Pirotte (1999). 
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such as energy efficiency standards. To consider this, we included a control measuring the log 
per capita CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement (from the 
World Bank, 2015) as a catch-all proxy for environmental effort. Our estimates for the price and 
income elasticities of natural gas remain similar. 
 
We also investigated alternative definitions of our instrument. We obtain quite similar second-
stage point estimates, but weaker first-stage identification, instrumenting with only domestic 
proved natural gas reserves per capita (i.e. 𝑅𝑐,𝑦/𝑆𝑐,𝑦). The same is true using an instrument that 
uses a distance weighting power of –0.5 instead of –1, which places a larger weight on other 
countries’ reserves. Our robustness checks are laid out in our estimation commands, available 
online. 
 
Publication bias has recently been found to be a concern in estimates of price and income 
elasticities of energy demand (Havranek et al., 2012; Havranek and Kokes, 2015), as well as 
other fields of research in energy economics (e.g. Havranek et al., 2015) and economics more 
broadly (e.g. Havránek, 2015). In response to this issue, we would like to reflect on our 
approach. We have used the maximum sample size for each estimation, with the principal 
constraint to a larger sample being the availability of data on natural gas prices. We did not have 
a strong prior on what the precise price or income elasticities of natural gas demand are, although 
economic intuition suggested that they are likely to be negative and positive, respectively. Our 
focus was on implementing a technique able to provide a reliable estimate. In doing so we built 
off the estimation strategies employed in the first author’s prior research (e.g. Burke and 
Nishitateno, 2013, 2015; Burke 2014; Burke and Liao, 2015), but with application to natural gas. 
We note that not all of our results are statistically significant: column 5 of Table 3 and column 4 
of Table 4 provide insignificant estimates of the price elasticity of natural gas demand, for 
example. We also obtain some insignificant coefficients for income (in two fixed-effects 
estimates) and the control variables (frequently). We have no conflict of interest to declare. Our 
approach – including the online provision of our data and estimation commands – involves a 
high standard of transparency.
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Table 5. Distributed lag results 
Dependent variable: Ln Natural gas consumption (primary)c,y 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ln Natural gas price (average of industry 
and household prices; real)c,y 
-0.55*** -0.25** -0.28*** -0.22** -0.22** -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
(0.16) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
   Lag 1  -0.25** 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09** -0.06 -0.08** 
  (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
   Lag 2   -0.30** -0.08 -0.13* -0.09 -0.06 -0.10** -0.05 
   (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
   Lag 3    -0.22** -0.09 -0.15* -0.13* -0.10 -0.15*** 
    (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
   Lag 4     -0.13 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 
     (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
   Lag 5      -0.12* 0.02 0.01 0.04 
      (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) 
   Lag 6       -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 
       (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
   Lag 7        -0.05 -0.08 
        (0.10) (0.05) 
   Lag 8         0.03 
         (0.09) 
Ln GDP per capitac,y 0.70** 0.94*** 1.00** 1.04** 1.09** 1.12** 1.13* 1.11* 1.07* 
(0.32) (0.34) (0.41) (0.47) (0.52) (0.54) (0.56) (0.55) (0.53) 
Ln Populationc,y 0.41 0.89 0.85 0.79 0.83 0.78 0.76 0.64 0.49 
(1.30) (1.11) (1.13) (1.18) (1.24) (1.22) (1.20) (1.17) (1.16) 
Temperature (◦C)c,y -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05* -0.05* -0.05*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Country and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 775 728 682 638 598 564 534 504 475 
Countries 39 39 38 35 32 29 29 29 27 
R2 0.55 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 
Long-run price elasticity -0.55*** -0.50*** -0.55*** -0.59*** -0.61*** -0.64*** -0.66*** -0.68*** -0.68*** 
Price elasticity from between estimate 
for same sub-sample 
-1.26*** -1.68*** -0.86*** -0.99*** -1.00*** -0.79** -0.77** -0.78** -0.70** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and clustered at the country level. The R2s 
reflect the power of the explanatory variables, except the country fixed effects. Coefficients on constants and country and year fixed effects not reported. The 
results in column 1 are the same as column 4 of Table 2. The long-run price elasticity is the sum of the coefficients for each price term. Ln Landc,y is included in 
estimations that use the between estimator. The sample size reduces across the columns due to missing data on lagged price. 
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4. Reconciling the estimates with prior studies 
Existing studies on natural gas demand typically examine a single country, and commonly report 
that demand for natural gas is price inelastic in both the short and long runs.15 Balestra and 
Nerlove (1966), for example, obtained a long-run price elasticity of demand for natural gas in the 
United States of –0.6, similar to Berndt and Watkins’ (1977) long-run estimate of –0.7 for 
household and commercial natural gas use in two Canadian provinces. Maddala et al. (1997) 
report estimates of the long-run price elasticity of household natural gas demand in the United 
States that vary from –0.2 to –1.4; Berkhout et al. (2004), Yoo et al. (2009), and Dagher (2012) 
use various specifications to report price elasticities of demand for natural gas of –0.2 for 
households in the Netherlands, South Korea, and Colorado; Payne et al. (2011) a long-run price 
elasticity of household natural gas demand in Illinois of –0.3; Alberini et al. (2011) a long-run 
price elasticity of natural gas demand of around –0.6 for household natural gas in the United 
States; and Wadud et al. (2011) a very inelastic response in Bangladesh. Some country-specific 
studies do, however, report that natural gas demand is price elastic. Yu et al. (2014), for example, 
pursue a static panel estimation of city-level residential natural gas demand in China, reporting a 
price elasticity of –1.4. Lin et al. (1987) report a long-run price elasticity of –1.2 for residences 
in the United States, and higher values for the commercial and industrial sectors. Our results are 
similar to their estimates. 
 
There are other studies that have used international data. Brenton (1997) used expenditure and 
price data for 60 countries from the 1980 International Comparison Project, obtaining estimates 
of the price elasticity of natural gas use of –0.9 for middle-income countries. Brenton obtained 
more elastic estimates for low- and high-income countries, although with low precision. He 
estimated expenditure elasticities of natural gas use of +1 and above. Krichene (2002) used 
cointegration analysis on data aggregated for the world as a whole and reported a long-run price 
elasticity of –1.1 for 1973–1999, similar to our estimates using national data. Asche et al. (2008) 
used a shrinkage estimator for 12 European countries and reported an average long-run price 
elasticity of demand for natural gas of only –0.1, while Dilaver et al. (2014) found a long-run 
price elasticity of –0.2 for an aggregate of European countries. Anderson et al. (2011) used data 
for 11 industries in 13 OECD countries, reporting long-run price elasticities of natural gas 
demand of –0.1 to –0.6. Our estimates using more aggregate data for a larger sample of countries 
suggest that natural gas is more price elastic than this. 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s modelling of fossil fuel subsidies (Coady et al., 2015) 
uses a long-run price elasticity of natural gas demand of –0.25, sourced from Liu’s (2004) study 
of 23 OECD countries over 1978–1999. Our higher estimates imply that the environmental 
benefits of natural gas subsidy reform may be larger than the IMF’s work suggests (assuming 
concurrent subsidy reform for other fossil fuels, and/or Pigouvian taxes). 
 
                                                 
15 See Al-Sahlawi (1989) for a review of early studies. 
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Prior estimates of the income elasticity of natural gas demand display a broad range. Many 
studies find that natural gas demand is income inelastic even in the long run (e.g. Berndt and 
Watkins, 1977; Yoo et al., 2009; Alberini et al., 2011), although Dilaver et al. (2014) and Asche 
et al. (2008), for example, report long-run income elasticities of +1.2 and +3 for Europe. Lin et 
al. (1987) report that natural gas demand in the United States is income elastic in the long run for 
the commercial and industrial sectors, but income inelastic for residences. Krichene (2002) 
reported a long-run income elasticity of +1.5 using globally-aggregated data, again similar to our 
estimates. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study uses national data to estimate the long-run price and income elasticities of natural gas 
demand. We find that the aggregate long-run price elasticity is around –1.25, more elastic than 
reported by most prior papers with a sector-specific focus (e.g. Anderson et al., 2011). Similar 
results are obtained using either single-equation or IV estimation. We also find quite similar 
results for aggregates of natural gas use by industry and households, although the short-run price 
elasticity of household demand for natural gas appears likely to be small. 
 
At the aggregate level, natural gas use appears to be more price sensitive than the demand for 
road-sector gasoline, for which estimates of the long-run price elasticity of demand are in the 
order of –0.2 to –0.6 (Havranek et al., 2012; Burke and Nishitateno, 2013; Burke, 2014; Arzaghi 
and Squalli, 2015). This makes sense, as there have been more substitution possibilities for 
natural gas in contexts such as electricity generation than have existed for road energy use. That 
price elasticities of demand for fossil fuels are negative implies that price-based approaches to 
mitigating negative externalities from fossil fuel use are indeed able to induce a reduction in 
consumption. The result also suggests that subsidy reform could lead to sizeable reductions in 
natural gas use and related emissions in countries that currently have below-cost natural gas 
prices. Subsidy reform for natural gas alone could induce substitution to other fossil fuels, but 
this would be less likely if subsidies for other fuels were reformed concurrently, and/or 
appropriate externality taxes applied. 
 
Our estimates suggest that the long-run income elasticity of natural gas demand is +1 or above, 
higher than what Csereklyei et al. (2016) and Burke and Csereklyei (2016) report for the long-
run income elasticity of aggregate energy use (+0.7). This is consistent with the observation that 
natural gas’s share of the global energy mix often increases as economies grow (Burke, 2013). In 
addition to income growth, switching to natural gas is currently being spurred by the price-
reducing effects of a supply-side boom in unconventional gas in the United States and elsewhere. 
 
This study has an aggregate, long-run focus. There is scope for more studies using within-
country data to examine micro-level factors affecting natural gas demand. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the macro-level elasticities in this paper will prove useful for modelling and other 
purposes.  
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
Natural gas consumption: Total primary use of natural gas, aggregated in terajoules. Natural gas 
is defined as gases occurring in underground deposits that consist mainly of methane. Natural 
gas may be in either liquefied or gaseous form and includes methane gas produced in association 
with crude oil or coal extraction. Source: IEA (2015a). 
 
Natural gas consumption by industry: Total final use of natural gas by industry, aggregated in 
terajoules. Industry includes: iron and steel; chemical and petrochemical; non-ferrous metals; 
non-metallic minerals; transport equipment; machinery; mining and quarrying; food and tobacco; 
paper, pulp, and print; wood and wood products; construction; textile and leather; and non-
specified. Source: IEA (2015a). 
 
Natural gas consumption by households: Total final use of natural gas by households, aggregated 
in terajoules. Excludes transport. Source: IEA (2015a). 
 
Natural gas price (average of industry and household prices; real): Simple mean of the average 
prices paid by (a) industry and (b) households, deflated by the US GDP deflator. Prices are the 
end-user price inclusive of taxes, measured in US$/MWh based on the gross calorific value of 
the gas. The price includes fixed charges. Source: IEA (2015c). Source of US GDP deflator: 
World Bank (2015). 
 
Natural gas price (industry; real): The average natural gas price paid by industry, deflated by the 
US GDP deflator. The price is the average end-user price inclusive of taxes, measured in 
US$/MWh based on the gross calorific value of the gas. The price includes fixed charges. 
Source: IEA (2015c). Source of US GDP deflator: World Bank (2015). 
 
Natural gas price (household; real): The average natural gas price paid by households, deflated 
by the US GDP deflator. The price is the average end-user price inclusive of taxes, measured in 
US$/MWh based on the gross calorific value of the gas. The price includes fixed charges. 
Source: IEA (2015c). Source of US GDP deflator: World Bank (2015). 
 
Natural gas reserves per capita: Proved reserves of natural gas in the country and in other 
countries (distance-weighted) as of 1 January, in million cubic feet per capita. See Eq. (3) for 
how this variable was calculated. For some cases of missing reserves data for a country, values 
for an adjacent year were used. Source of natural gas reserves: U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2015). Source of distance data: CEPII (2016).  
 
GDP per capita: Expenditure-side real gross domestic product in chained purchasing power 
parity terms. Measured in million year-2005 US$ per capita. Source: Feenstra et al. (2015). 
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Population: Total population at mid-year, following the de-facto definition. Source: World Bank 
(2015). If missing, data from Feenstra et al. (2015) were used. 
 
Land: Total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, 
and exclusive economic zones, in squared kilometers. Source: World Bank (2015). 
 
Temperature (◦C): Temperature averaged over each country’s land area and over the 12 months 
of the year. Source: Harris et al. (2014). Data version: CRU TS v3.22. See 
https://crudata.uea.ac.uk/cru/data/hrg/. For Chinese Taipei, a value of 22◦C was used 
(http://www.taiwan.climatemps.com/). 
 
Gasoline price: Pump price of the most widely-sold grade of gasoline, in US$. Source: World 
Bank (2015). 
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